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Abstract
Arguments play two types of roles w.r.t. decision, namely
helping to select an alternative, or to explain a choice. Until
now, the various attempts at formalizing argument-based de-
cision making have relied only on one type of arguments, in
favor of or against alternatives.
The paper proposes a systematic typology that identiﬁes eight
types of arguments, some of them being weaker than others.
First the setting emphasizes the bipolar nature of the eval-
uation of decision results by making an explicit distinction
between prioritized goals to be pursued, and prioritized rejec-
tions that are stumbling blocks to be avoided. This is the basis
for an argumentative framework for decision. Each decision
is supported by arguments emphasizing its positive conse-
quences in terms of goals certainly satisﬁed, goals possibly
satisﬁed, rejections certainly avoided and rejections possi-
bly avoided. A decision can also be attacked by arguments
emphasizing its negative consequences in terms of certainly
or possibly missed goals, or rejections certainly or possibly
led to by that decision. The logical properties of this frame-
work are studied. The richness of the proposed typology
makes it possible to partition the set of alternatives into four
classes, giving thus a status to decisions, which may be rec-
ommended, discommended, controversial or neutral. Each
class may be reﬁned into sub-classes taking advantage of the
strengths of the different types of arguments. This typology is
also helpful from an explanation point of view for being able
to use the right type of arguments depending on the context.
The paper also presents a preliminary investigation on de-
cision principles that can be used for comparing decisions.
Three classes of principles can be considered: unipolar, bipo-
lar or non-polar principles depending on whether i) only ar-
guments pro or only arguments cons, or ii) both types, or iii)
an aggregation of them into a meta-argument are used.
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Introduction
Decision making, often viewed as a form of reasoning to-
ward action, has raised the interest of many scholars includ-
ing philosophers, economists, psychologists, and computer
scientists for a long time. Any decision problem amounts to
select the best option(s) among different alternatives.
The decision problem has been considered from different
points of view. Classical decision theory, as developed by
economists, has focused mainly on identifying criteria for
comparingdifferentalternatives. Theinputsofthisapproach
are a set of feasible actions, and a function that assesses the
value of their consequences when the actions are performed
in a given state. The output is a preference relation between
actions. A decision criterion, such as the classical expected
utility (Savage 1954), should then be justiﬁed on the basis of
a set of postulates to which the preference relation between
action should obey. Note that such an approach considers a
group of candidate actions as a whole rather than focusing
on a candidate action individually. Moreover, the candidate
actions are supposed to be feasible.
More recently, some researchers in AI have advocated the
need for a new approach in which the different aspects that
may be involved in a decision problem (such as the goals
of the agent, the feasibility of an action, its consequences,
the conﬂicts between goals, the alternative plans for achiev-
ing the same goal, etc) can be handled. In (Bratman 1987;
Bratman, Israel, & Pollack 1988), it has been argued that
this can be done by representing the cognitive states, namely
agent’s beliefs, desires and intentions (thus the so-called
BDI architecture). The decision problem is then to select
among the conﬂicting desires a consistent and feasible sub-
set that will constitute the intentions. The above line of re-
search takes its inspiration in the work of philosophers who
have advocated practical reasoning (Raz 1978). Practical
reasoning mainly deals with the adoption, ﬁlling in, and re-
consideration of intentions and plans. Moreover, it allows
reasoning about individual actions using for instance the
well-known practical syllogism (Walton 1996):
• G is a goal ﬁr agent a
• Doing action A is sufﬁcient for agent a to carry out goal
G
• Then, agent a ought to do action A
In this setting, a candidate action may be rejected because
it may lead to the violation of other important goals, or to
other bad consequences, etc.
In this paper, we are concerned with an argumenta-
tive counterpart of classical decision theory. Humans use
arguments for supporting, attacking or explaining choices.
Indeed, each potential choice has usually pros and cons of
various strengths. Adopting such an approach in a decision
support system would have some obvious beneﬁts. Onthe one hand, not only would the user be provided with a
“good” choice, but also with the reasons underlying this rec-
ommendation, in a format that is easy to grasp. On the other
hand, argumentation-based decision making is expected to
be more akin with the way humans deliberate and ﬁnally
make or understand a choice. This argumentative view of
decision has not been much considered until recently even
if the idea of basing decisions on arguments pros and cons
is very old and was already somewhat formally stated by
Benjamin Franklin (Franklin 1887) more than two hundred
years ago.
Articulating decisions on the basis of arguments is relevant
for different decision problems or approaches such as
decision under uncertainty, multiple criteria decisions, or
rule-based decisions. For instance, in medical domains,
decisions are usually to be made under incomplete or
uncertain information, and the potential results of candidate
decisions may be evaluated from different criteria. More-
over, there may exist some expertise under the form of
decision rules that associate possible decisions with given
contexts. Thus, the different types of decision problems
interfere, and consequently a uniﬁed argumentation-based
model may be still more worth developing.
Whatever the decision problem is, the basic idea is that
candidate decisions may lead to positively or negatively
assessed results. This gives birth to arguments in favor
of (pros) or against (cons) a decision in a given context.
Different attempts at formalizing argument-based decision
making can be found in the literature (Fox & Das 2000;
Fox, Krause, & Ambler 1992; Bonet & Geffner 1996;
Brewka & Gordon 1994; Amgoud & Prade 2004;
Dubois & Fargier 2005; Amgoud, Bonnefon, & Prade
2005). These works do not much discuss the nature of
arguments in a decision analysis, and usually rely on
one type of argument that may be in favor of or against
alternatives.
This paper emphasizes the bipolar nature of the evaluation
of decision results, by making an explicit distinction
between goals having a positive ﬂavor, and rejections,
with a negative ﬂavor, that are stumbling blocks to be
avoided. This, for instance, applies to criteria scales where
the positive grades (associated with positive results) are
separated from the negative ones (associated with negative
results) by one or several neutral values.
The paper proposes a systematic typology that identiﬁes
eight types of arguments. Some of them are weaker than
others, since they rather reﬂect the existence of examples
or counter-examples as supporting or challenging possible
choices. In the proposed framework, each decision is
supported by arguments emphasizing its positive features in
terms of goals certainly satisﬁed, goals possibly satisﬁed,
rejections certainly avoided and rejections possibly avoided.
The possibility that a goal may be reached or that a rejection
may be avoided is assessed in practice by the existence of
relevant known examples. A decision can also be attacked
by arguments emphasizing its negative features in terms of
certainly or possibly missed goals, or rejections certainly
or possibly led to by that decision. The richness of the
proposed typology makes it possible to partition the set
of alternatives into four classes, giving thus a status to
decisions, which may be recommended, discommended,
controversial or neutral. Each class may be reﬁned into
sub-classes taking advantage of the strengths of the different
types of arguments.
The aim of this paper is also to present a general discus-
sion and a ﬁrst study of the different classes of argument-
based decision principles. In the following, we argue that
three main classes of principles can be distinguished:
1. Unipolar principles that focus only on one type of argu-
ments when comparing choices (either arguments pros or
arguments cons)
2. Bipolar principles that take into account both types of ar-
guments but still keeping the distinction between the two
types
3. Non-polar principles that consist of aggregating the two
types of arguments into a meta-argument and compare
pairs of choices on the basis of their meta-arguments.
Note that, the use of sufﬁx “polar” here refers to the di-
chotomy between arguments pros and arguments cons (and
not to the bipolar structure induced by goals and rejections).
A general framework for decision making
Solving a decision problem amounts to deﬁning a pre-
ordering, usually a complete one, on a set D of possible
choices (or decisions), on the basis of the different conse-
quences of each decision. Argumentation can be used for
deﬁning such a pre-ordering. An argumentation-based deci-
sion process can be decomposed into the following steps:
1. Constructing arguments in favor/against each decision in
D.
2. Evaluating the strength of each argument.
3. Comparing decisions on the basis of their arguments.
4. Deﬁning a pre-ordering on D.
In (Amgoud, Bonnefon, & Prade 2005), an argumentation-
based decision framework is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 (Argumentation-based decision framework)
An argumentation-based decision framework is a tuple <D,
A, , .Princ> where:
• D is a set of all possible choices.
• A is a set of arguments.
•  is a (partial or complete) pre-ordering on A.
• .Princ (for principle for comparing decisions), deﬁnes a
(partial or complete) pre-ordering on D, deﬁned on the
basis of A.
The output of the framework is a (complete or partial) pre-
ordering .Princ, on D. d1 .Princ d2 means that the decision
d1 is at least as preferred as the decision d2 w.r.t. the princi-
ple Princ.Notation: Let A, B be two arguments of A, and  be a pre-
order (maybe partial) on A. A  B means that A is at least
as ‘strong’ as B.
 and ≈ will denote respectively the strict ordering and the
relation of equivalence associated with the preference be-
tween arguments, deﬁned as follows:
• A  B iff A  B and not (B  A) (meaning that A is
strictly stronger than B),
• A ≈ B iff A  B and B  A (meaning that A is as strong
as B).
Different deﬁnitions of  or different deﬁnitions of .Princ
may lead to different decision frameworks that may not re-
turn the same results.
Logical language
In what follows, let L be a propositional language. From L
we can distinguish the four following sets:
1. The set D gathers all the possible alternatives, or deci-
sions. These candidate actions are assumed to be feasible.
Elements of D are supposed to be represented by literals.
2. The set K represents the background knowledge that is
assumed to be consistent. Elements of K are formulas of
L.
3. The set G gathers the goals of an agent. A goal represents
what the agent wants to achieve, and has thus a positive
ﬂavor. This base is assumed to be consistent too, i.e. an
agent is not allowed to have contradictory goals. Note that
a goal may be expressed in terms of a logical combination
of constraints on criteria values, and does not necessarily
refer to one criterion. Elements of G are supposed to be
literals.
4. The set R gathers the rejections of an agent. A rejection
represents what the agent wants to avoid. Clearly rejec-
tions express negative preferences. The set {¬r|r ∈ R}
is assumed to be consistent since acceptable alternatives
should satisfy ¬r due to the rejection of r. However, note
that if r is a rejection, this does not necessarily mean that
¬r is a goal. For instance, in case of choosing a medical
drug, one may have as a goal the immediate availability
of the drug, and as a rejection its availability only after at
least two days. As it can be guessed on this example, if g
is a goal only r such that r ` ¬g can be a rejection, and
conversely. This means that rejection can be more spe-
ciﬁc than the negation of goals. Moreover, recent cogni-
tive psychology studies (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Bernston
1997) have conﬁrmed the cognitive validity of this dis-
tinction between goals and rejections. Elements of R are
supposed to be literals.
Deﬁnition 2 A decision problem is a tuple T = hD, K, G,
Ri.
A new typology of arguments
When solving a decision problem, there may exist several
alternative solutions. Each alternative may have arguments
in its favor (called PROS), and arguments against it (called
CONS). In the following, an argument is associated with an
alternative, and always either refers to a goal or to a rejec-
tion.
Arguments PROS point out the existence of good con-
sequences or the absence of bad consequences for a given
alternative. More precisely, we can distinguish between two
types of good consequences, namely the guaranteed satis-
faction of a goal when K ∪ {d} ` g, and the possible satis-
faction of a goal when K∪{d} 6` ¬g, with d ∈ D and g ∈ G.
Note that this latter situation corresponds to the existence of
an interpretation that satisﬁes K, d, and g. This leads to the
following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 3 (Types of positive arguments PRO) Let T
be a decision problem. A positively expressed argument in
favor of an alternative d is a pair A = hd,gi such that:
1. d ∈ D, g ∈ G, K ∪ {d} is consistent
2. • K ∪ {d} ` g (arguments of Type SPP), or
• K ∪ {d} 6` ¬g (arguments of Type WPP)
The consistency of K ∪ {d} means that d is applicable in
the context K, in other words that we cannot prove from K
that d is impossible. This means that impossible alternatives
w.r.t. K have been already taken out when deﬁning the set
D.
Note that SPP arguments are stronger than WPP ones since
(K ∪ {d} ` g) entails (K ∪ {d} 6` ¬g). SPP stands for
“Strong Positive PROS”, whereas WPP is short for “Weak
Positive PROS”. Clearly, WPP arguments have interest only
when the corresponding SPP do not exist. From a practical
point of view, SPP arguments will be generally expressed by
only exhibiting a minimal subset S of K such that S ∪ {d}
` g, while a WPP argument corresponds to the existence
of (at least) one known case where g was satisﬁed while d
was applied. This means that together with K, the agent
stores a case memory of already experienced choices. Let
ArgSPP(d) (resp. ArgWPP(d)) be the set of all arguments
of type SPP (resp. WPP) in favor of d in the sense of the
above deﬁnition. The following inclusion holds:
Property 1 Let d ∈ D. Then ArgSPP(d) ⊆ ArgWPP(d).
Similarly, there are two forms of absence of bad conse-
quences that lead to arguments PROS: the ﬁrst one amounts
to avoid a rejection for sure, i.e. K ∪ {d} ` ¬r, and the
second form corresponds only to the possibility of avoiding
a rejection (K ∪ {d} 6` r), which can be testiﬁed in prac-
tice by the existence of a case counter-example assuring that
K ∧ d ∧ ¬r is consistent (with r ∈ R). This leads to the
following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 4 (Types of negative arguments PROS) Let T
be a decision problem. A negatively expressed argument in
favor of an alternative is a pair A = hd,ri such that:
1. d ∈ D, r ∈ R, K ∪ {d} is consistent
2. • K ∪ {d} ` ¬r (arguments of Type SNP), or
• K ∪ {d} 6` r (arguments of Type WNP)
Here again, SNP arguments are stronger than WNP ones
since K ∪ {d} ` ¬r entails K ∪ {d} 6` r. SNP stands for“Strong Negative PROS”, while WNP means “Weak Nega-
tive PROS”. Let ArgSNP(d) (resp. ArgWNP(d)) be the set
of all arguments of type SNP (resp. WNP) in favor of d.
Property 2 Let d ∈ D. Then ArgSNP(d) ⊆ ArgWNP(d).
Arguments CONS highlight the existence of bad conse-
quences for a given alternative, or the absence of good ones.
As in the case of arguments PROS, there are a strong form
and a weak form of both situations. Namely, negatively ex-
pressed arguments CONS are deﬁned either by exhibiting a
rejection that is necessarily satisﬁed, or a rejection that is
possibly satisﬁed. Formally:
Deﬁnition 5 (Types of negative arguments CONS) Let T
be a decision problem. A negatively expressed argument
against an alternative d is a pair A = hd,gi such that:
1. d ∈ D, r ∈ R, K ∪ {d} is consistent
2. • K ∪ {d} ` r (arguments of Type SNC), or
• K ∪ {d} 6` ¬r (arguments of Type WNC)
Let ArgSNC(d) (resp. ArgWNC(d)) be the set of all
arguments of type SNC (resp. WNC) against d, where C
stands for Cons.
Property 3 Let d ∈ D. Then ArgSNC(d) ⊆ ArgWNC(d).
Lastly, the absence of positive consequences can also be
seenasanargumentagainst(CONS)analternative. Astrong
form and a weak form of positively expressed arguments
against an alternative can be deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 6 (Types of arguments CONS) Let T be a de-
cision problem. A positively expressed argument against an
alternative is a pair A = hd,gi such that:
1. d ∈ D, g ∈ G, K ∪ {d} is consistent
2. • K ∪ {d} ` ¬g (arguments of Type SPC), or
• K ∪ {d} 6` g (arguments of Type WPC)
Let ArgSPC(d) (resp. ArgWPC(d)) be the set of all argu-
ments of type SPC (resp. WPC) against d.
Property 4 Let d ∈ D. Then ArgSPC(d) ⊆ ArgWPC(d).
Let us consider positively expressed arguments for instance.
Observe that for a given alternative d and a ﬁxed goal g, all
the types of arguments cannot take place at the same time.
Formally,
Property 5 SPP and WPC (resp. SPC and WPP, and SPP
and SPC) arguments are mutually exclusive.
In the ﬁrst two cases, this is due to the opposite character-
istic conditions of the deﬁnitions. The last exclusion is due
to the consistency of K ∪ {d}, and thus g and ¬g cannot be
obtained simultaneously. Taking into account the subsump-
tions between weak and strong forms of arguments, the fol-
lowing result holds:
Property 6 Let d ∈ D and g ∈ G. There are only three pos-
sible situations w.r.t a positively expressed argument linking
d and g, namely: i) there is an SPP argument, ii) there is
an SPC argument, iii) there are both an WPP and an WPC
arguments.
The above property reﬂects the three possible epistemic
statuses of a knowledge base (K ∪ {d}) w.r.t a proposition
(here g), which may be true, false, or having an unknown
truth status. In the latter case, emphasizing either a WPP
argument, or a WPC argument is a matter of optimism vs
pessimism to which we come back later. Since WPP and
WPC arguments are somewhat neutralizing each other, we
will not consider them in the decision status classiﬁcation
that we introduce now.
Decision status
In the previous section, we have shown that each decision
may be supported by two types of strong arguments, and at-
tacked by two other types of strong arguments. In summary,
given a decision d ∈ D, we will have the following sets of
arguments:
• ArgSPP(d) = those arguments which capture the goals
that are reached when applying d in context C
• ArgSNP(d) = those arguments which capture the rejec-
tions that are avoided when applying d in context C
• ArgSNC(d) = those arguments which capture the rejec-
tions that are not avoided when applying d in context C
• ArgSPC(d) = those arguments which capture the goals
that are missed when applying d in context C
Notethatwhenagivensetisempty, forinstanceArgSPP(d)
= ∅, this does not mean at all that decision d cannot lead
to any goal, but rather we cannot be certain that a goal is
reached as some information is missing. The above types
of arguments supporting or attacking a choice d give birth
to four main different statuses for that decision: recom-
mended, discommended, neutral and controversial (see Ta-
ble 1 for the straightforward formal deﬁnitions). Recom-
mended choices are those choices that have only arguments
in favor of them and no arguments against them (whatever
their type). Discommended choices are those choices that
have no arguments in favor of them and only arguments
against them. Regarding neutral choices, they have neither
arguments in favor of them, nor arguments against. Choices
that have at the same time arguments in favor of them and
arguments against are said controversial. As shown in Table
1, there are 9 situations in which a choice is controversial.
Property 7 Let d ∈ D. Then d is either fully recommended,
or fully discommended, or controversial or neutral.
Note that one may give priority to SPP and SNC arguments,
which directly state that a goal is reached, or a rejection is
not missed respectively. SNP and SPC arguments that are
in favor of or against a choice only indirectly can be used
for reﬁning the two ﬁrst types of arguments. For instance, in
Table 1, a choice that has both SPP and SNP arguments in
favor of it is strongly recommended, whereas a choice with
only SPP arguments in favor of it is only recommended.
This classiﬁcation of choices is of interest from a per-
suasion or explanation perspective, since e.g recommended
choices are more easily arguable than controversial ones.
This does not mean that recommended choices are always
better than any other as we shall see in the next section.Status Sub-status Combination
Recommended Strongly recom. hArgSPP(d) 6= ∅,ArgSNP(d) 6= ∅,ArgSNC(d) = ∅,ArgSPC(d) = ∅i
Recom. hArgSPP(d) 6= ∅,ArgSNP(d) = ∅,ArgSNC(d) = ∅,ArgSPC(d) = ∅i
Weakly recom. hArgSPP(d) = ∅,ArgSNP(d) 6= ∅,ArgSNC(d) = ∅,ArgSPC(d) = ∅i
Discommended Strongly discom. hArgSPP(d) = ∅,ArgSNP(d) = ∅,ArgSNC(d) 6= ∅,ArgSPC(d) 6= ∅i
Discom. hArgSPP(d) = ∅,ArgSNP(d) = ∅,ArgSNC(d) 6= ∅,ArgSPC(d) = ∅i
Weakly discom. hArgSPP(d) = ∅,ArgSNP(d) = ∅,ArgSNC(d) = ∅,ArgSPC(d) 6= ∅i
Neutral hArgSPP(d) = ∅,ArgSNP(d) = ∅,ArgSNC(d) = ∅,ArgSPC(d) = ∅i
Controversial hArgSPP(d) 6= ∅,ArgSNP(d) 6= ∅,ArgSNC(d) 6= ∅,ArgSPC(d) 6= ∅i
hArgSPP(d) 6= ∅,ArgSNP(d) 6= ∅,ArgSNC(d) 6= ∅,ArgSPC(d) = ∅i
hArgSPP(d) 6= ∅,ArgSNP(d) 6= ∅,ArgSNC(d) = ∅,ArgSPC(d) 6= ∅i
hArgSPP(d) 6= ∅,ArgSNP(d) = ∅,ArgSNC(d) 6= ∅,ArgSPC(d) 6= ∅i
hArgSPP(d) 6= ∅,ArgSNP(d) = ∅,ArgSNC(d) 6= ∅,ArgSPC(d) = ∅i
hArgSPP(d) 6= ∅,ArgSNP(d) = ∅,ArgSNC(d) = ∅,ArgSPC(d) 6= ∅i
hArgSPP(d) = ∅,ArgSNP(d) 6= ∅,ArgSNC(d) 6= ∅,ArgSPC(d) 6= ∅i
hArgSPP(d) 6= ∅,ArgSNP(d) = ∅,ArgSNC(d) = ∅,ArgSPC(d) 6= ∅i
hArgSPP(d) = ∅,ArgSNP(d) 6= ∅,ArgSNC(d) = ∅,ArgSPC(d) 6= ∅i
Table 1: Decision status
Principles for comparing decisions
In the following we are interested in discussing possible
choices for .Princ. The relation  is assumed to be given. It
may be either a partial or a complete preorder. This preorder
may account for the certainty of the pieces of knowledge in-
volved in the argument and/or to the importance of the goal
to which the argument pertains. However, this will not be
detailed in the following.
Comparing choices on the basis of the sets of PROS or
CONS arguments that are associated with them is a key
step in an argumentative decision process. Depending on
what sets are considered and how they are handled, one can
roughly distinguish between three categories of principles:
Unipolar principles: are those that only refer to either the
arguments PROS or the arguments CONS.
Bipolar principles: are those that reason on both types of
arguments at the same time.
Non-polar principles: are those where arguments PROS
and arguments CONS a given choice are aggregated into
a unique meta-argument. It results that the negative and
positive polarities disappear in the aggregation.
Below we present the main principles that can be thought
of for each category. In what follows, ArgPro(d) =
ArgSPP(d) ∪ ArgSNP(d), and ArgCons(d) = ArgSNC(d)
∪ ArgSPC(d). Moreover, the function Result returns for
a given set of arguments, all the goals/rejections involved in
those arguments.
Unipolar principles
In this section we present basic criteria for comparing deci-
sionsonthebasisofonlyargumentsPROS.Notethatsimilar
ideas apply to arguments CONS.
We start by presenting those criteria that do not involve
the strength of arguments, then their respective reﬁnements
when strength is taken into account.
A ﬁrst natural criterion consists of preferring the decision
d1 over d2 if for each argument <d2,g>, there exists an
argument <d1,g>, while the reverse is not true. Formally:
Deﬁnition 7 Let d1, d2 ∈ D.
d1 . d2 iff Result(ArgPro(d2)) ⊆ Result(ArgPro(d1)).
This partial preorder is reﬁned by the following complete
preorder in terms of cardinality, i.e preferring the decision
that has more arguments PROS.
Deﬁnition 8 (Counting arguments PROS) Let d1, d2 ∈
D.
d1 . d2 iff |ArgPro(d1)| ≥ |ArgPro(d2)|.
When the strength of arguments is taken into account in the
decision process, one may think of preferring a choice that
has a dominant argument, i.e. an argument PROS that is
preferred to any argument PROS the other choices.
Deﬁnition 9 Let d1, d2 ∈ D.
d1 . d2 iff ∃ A ∈ ArgPro(d1) such that ∀ B ∈ ArgPro(d2),
A  B.
The above deﬁnition relies heavily on the relation  that
compares arguments. Thus, the properties of this criterion
depends on those of . Namely, it can be checked that the
above criterion works properly only if  is a complete pre-
order.
Property 8 If the relation  is a complete preorder, then .
is also a complete preorder.
Note that the above relation may be found to be too restric-
tive, since when the strongest arguments in favor of d1 and
d2 have equivalent strengths (in the sense of ≈), d1 and d2
are also seen as equivalent. However, we can reﬁne the
above deﬁnition by ignoring the strongest arguments with
equal strengths, by means of the following strict preorder.Deﬁnition 10 Let d1, d2 ∈ D, and  a complete preorder.
Let (P1, ..., Pr), (P0
1, ..., P0
s) be the vectors of arguments
PROS the decisions d1 and d2 respectively. Each of these
vectors is assumed to be decreasingly ordered w.r.t  (e.g.
P1  ...  Pr). Let v = min(r, s).
d1 . d2 iff:
• P1  P0
1, or
• ∃ k ≤ v such that Pk  P0
k and ∀ j < k, Pj ≈ P0
j, or
• r > v and ∀ j ≤ v, Pj ≈ P0
j.
Note that in all the above criteria, the two types of arguments
PROS are considered as having the same importance. Thus,
reasoning with goals is as important as reasoning with rejec-
tions. However, this may be debatable, since one may prefer
arguments ensuring that a goal is reached to an argument
that shows that a rejection is avoided, since the latter is the
least thing that can be expected. On the basis of this new
source of preference between arguments, the above criteria
can be further reformulated by processing separately the two
sets of arguments. More precisely, we can apply the above
deﬁnitions only for the set of arguments of type SPP, and
only in case of ties to apply again the same deﬁnitions on
SNP arguments. We may even a different criterion on the
set SNP of arguments.
Another point that is worth discussing is the impact of
possible dependencies between goals (or rejections) on the
decision criteria. Namely, assume that two goals are, for
instance, redundant, i.e they are logically equivalent giving
K. Applying the cardinality-based criterion may lead to
privilege decisions reaching redundant goals. This maybe
debatable although allowing for redundancy is clearly a way
of stressing the importance of a goal (or a rejection). Note
that not all the above criteria are sensible to redundancy, for
instance the ﬁrst one (Deﬁnition 7).
Till now, we have only discussed decision criteria
based on arguments PROS. However, the counterpart
criteria when arguments CONS are considered can also be
deﬁned. Thus, the counterpart criterion of the one deﬁned
in Deﬁnition 7 is the following partial preorder:
Deﬁnition 11 Let d1, d2 ∈ D. d1 . d2 iff
Result(ArgCons(d1)) ⊆ Result(ArgCons(d2)).
Similarly, it reﬁnement in terms of cardinality is given by
the following complete preorder:
Deﬁnition 12 (Counting arguments CONS) Let d1, d2 ∈
D.
d1 . d2 iff |ArgCons(d1)| ≤ |ArgCons(d2)|.
The criteria that take into account the strengths of argu-
ments have also their counterparts when handling arguments
CONS.
Deﬁnition 13 Let d1, d2 ∈ D.
d1 . d2 iff ∃ B ∈ ArgCons(d2) such that ∀ A ∈
ArgCons(d1), B  A.
As in the case of arguments PROS, when the relation  is
a complete preorder, the above relation is also a complete
preorder, and can be reﬁned into the following strict one.
Deﬁnition 14 Let d1, d2 ∈ D.
Let (C1, ..., Cr), (C0
1, ..., C0
s) be the vectors of arguments
CONS the decisions d1 and d2. Each of these vectors is
assumed to be decreasingly ordered w.r.t  (e.g. C1  ... 
Cr). Let v = min(r, s).
d1  d2 iff:
• C0
1  C1, or
• ∃ k ≤ v such that C0
k  Ck and ∀ j < k, Cj ≈ C0
j, or
• v < s and ∀ j ≤ v, Cj ≈ C0
j.
Finally, it may be also worth distinguishing between SNC
and SPC arguments, and to privilege those which are SNC
since they are the most striking ones. Similar ideas given in
the case of arguments PROS apply.
Bipolar principles
Let’s now deﬁne some principles where both types of argu-
ments (PROS and CONS) are taken in account when com-
paring decisions. Generally speaking, we can conjunctively
combine the criteria dealing with arguments PROS with
their counterpart handling arguments CONS. For instance,
the criterion given in Deﬁnition 8 can be combined with that
given in Deﬁnition 12 into the following one:
Deﬁnition 15 Let d1, d2 ∈ D.
d1 . d2 iff
1. |ArgPro(d1)| ≥ |ArgPro(d2)|, and
2. |ArgCons(d1)| ≤ |ArgCons(d2)|.
However, notethatunfortunatelythisisnolongeracomplete
preorder. Similarly, the criteria given respectively in Deﬁni-
tion 9 and Deﬁnition 13 can be combined into the following
one:
Deﬁnition 16 Let d1, d2 ∈ D.
d1 . d2 iff:
• ∃ A ∈ Argpros(d1) such that ∀ B ∈ Argpros(d2), A 
B.
• @ A’ ∈ ArgCons(d1) such that ∀ B’ ∈ ArgCons(d2), A
 B.
This means that one prefers a decision which has at least one
supporting argument which is better than any supporting
argument of the other decision, and also which has not a
very strong argument against it.
Note that the above deﬁnition can be also reﬁned in the
same spirit as Deﬁnitions 10 and 14.
Another family of bipolar decision criteria applies the
Franklin principle which is a natural extension to the
bipolar case of the idea underlying Deﬁnition 10. This
criterion consists, when comparing pros and CONS a
decision, of ignoring pairs of arguments pros and CONS
which have the same strength. After such a simpliﬁcation,
one can apply any of the above bipolar principles. In what
follows, we will deﬁne formally the Franklin simpliﬁcation.
Deﬁnition 17 (Franklin simpliﬁcation) Let d ∈ D.
Let P = (P1, ..., Pr), (C = C1, ..., Cm) be the vectors
of the arguments PROS and CONS the decision d. Each of
these vectors is assumed to be decreasingly ordered w.r.t (e.g. P1  ...  Pr).
The result of the simpliﬁcation is P0 = (Pj+1, ..., Pr), C0 =
(Cj+1, ..., Cm) such that:
• ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ j, Pi ≈ Ci and (Pj+1  Cj+1 or Cj+1  Pj+1)
• If j = r (resp. j = m), then P0 = ∅ (resp. C0 = ∅).
Non-polar principles
In some applications, the arguments in favor of and against a
decision are aggregated into a unique meta-argument having
a unique strength. Thus, comparing two decisions amounts
to compare the resulting meta-arguments. Such a view is
well in agreement with current practice in multiple princi-
ples decision making, where each decision is evaluated ac-
cording to different principles using the same scale (with a
positive and a negative part), and an aggregation function is
used to obtain a global evaluation of each decision.
Deﬁnition 18 (Aggregation criterion) Let d1, d2 ∈ D. Let
<P1, ..., Pn> and <C1, ..., Cm> (resp. <P1’, ..., Pl’>
and <C1’, ..., Ck’>) the vectors of the arguments PROS
and CONS the decision d1 (resp. d2).
d1 . d2 iff h(P1, ..., Pn, C1, ..., Cm)  h(P1’, ..., Pl’, C1’,
..., Ck’), where h is an aggregation function.
A simple example of this aggregation attitude is computing
thedifferenceofthenumberofargumentsPROSandCONS.
Deﬁnition 19 Let d1, d2 ∈ D.
d1 . d2 iff |ArgPros(d1)| − |ArgCons(d1)| ≥
|ArgPros(d2)| - |ArgCons(d2)|.
This has the advantage to be again a complete preorder,
while taking into account both PROS and CONS arguments.
Conclusion
The paper has proposed an argumentation-based framework
for decision making. The framework emphasizes clearly
the bipolar nature of the consequences of choices by distin-
guishing goals to be pursued from rejections to be avoided.
This bipolar setting gives birth to two kinds of arguments
for each choice: arguments in favor of that choice and ar-
guments against it. Moreover, we have shown that there
are four types of arguments PROS a choice (resp. against
a choice), and some of them are stronger than others. The
different types of arguments allow us to give a unique sta-
tus to each choice (recommended, discommended, neutral
or controversial). We have also proposed different criteria
for comparing pairs of choices. The proposed approach is
very general and includes as particular cases already studied
argumentation-based decision principles (Fox & Das 2000;
Amgoud & Prade 2004; Dubois & Fargier 2005). Besides,
the richness of the different possible behaviors when arguing
a decision in this framework should be compared to the ac-
tual practice of humans as studied in cognitive psychology.
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